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the article discusses creativity as an ontological principle as it is presented in 
scientific-philosophical attitudes of a Nobel Prize winner for chemistry Ilya 
Prigogine and Werner heisenberg’s pupil and a former director of the max 
Planck institute for Physics hans-Peter Dürr. these attitudes are assessed in 
the light of heideggerian notions of Being, subiectum, ousia and time and thus 
they themselves shed light on the potentiality of heideggerian mode of think-
ing on the conception of the creative in the postmodern society and science. 
Bergsonian notion of creativity is also invoked. it is presented as a philosophical 
basis of the postmodern techno-scientific creativity and is discussed in terms of 
heideggerian ecstatic temporality. the juxtaposition of the notions presented by 
henri Bergson and martin heidegger provides the clue to compare and assess 
the science-based attitudes of Prigogine and Dürr.
keywords: creativity, ilya Prigogine, hans-Peter Dürr, henri Bergson, martin 
heidegger, ontology.
Introduction
Creativity has often been related to will as well as opposed to mechanistic approaches 
to either the subjective sphere (of politics, society etc.) or the objective one (i.e. nat-
ural realms of physics, biology etc.). the objective mechanistic principle of cause and 
effect has its counterpart in the human subject’s means-to-ends rationality, both of 
them being manifestations of the principle of ground. Following the humean rejec-
tion of ontological grounds for the principle of cause and effect, the latter has also 
become radically subjective. this deprivation of “objective” grounds for the causality 
principle and the subjectivisation thereof did not, of course, lead to its rejection but, 
instead, opened the way to new and promising constructivist strategies both in the 
experimental-technological revealing of the natural realm and the scientific handling 
of human subjects in the polity or the society or even worldwide. the ever-sharpening 
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emphasis on the value of subjective individuality in the religious, the social and the 
political sphere has progressed concurrently with the techno-scientific attitude and 
prowess of modernity (stretching into postmodernity). in fact, the two are just differ-
ent names or manifestations of the same principle that heidegger (in his Nietzsche lec-
tures) calls subjectity (Subjektität). it is characterized by the identity of object (Gegen-
stand) and subject: the Gegenstand is such a revealing of Being which is performed 
by man turned into the subiectum, i.e. the ground and source of the truth of beings 
which is in turn the truth as certainty. The latter is techno-scientifically-achieved cer-
tainty of the truth of revealed beings in general as well as certainty of one’s own in-
nermost individual or collective meaningful (truthful) existence. the meaning-giving, 
or truth-giving, praxis of individual or collective happiness takes place and part in 
the technological revelation of beings as a whole on both the cosmological and the 
politico-social level. the name for this revelation of beings as a whole is creativity: it 
manifests itself all-in-one in the creative technology-powered endeavour of man and 
in the conception of the universe (or even Being) itself as creative. the creative will is 
at the source of both human action and the world at large. the way the will works is 
techno-scientific1.
Described above is the context or situation in which the following juxtaposition of 
two current non-deterministic physical theories is presented. One of them is that of 
the chaotic temporal universe by Prigogine, inspired by Bergson’s philosophy of élan 
vital, the other is the Wirklichkeit approach by the pupil and follower of heisenberg, 
Dürr, drawing on the German tradition of the thinking of Geist as well as, or includ-
ing, especially the heideggerian critique of the Cartesian res. i will assess these two 
scientific theories in terms of revelation of Being (cf. Stasiulis 2014: 51–70) and I will 
prefer Dürr’s Gestalt approach over Prigogine’s chaotic evolution based on my com-
parison of philosophies of heidegger and Bergson.
General context in brief
the mechanistic approach to nature was also materialistic as it described mechan-
ical relations as taking place in a material res or between several material res. the 
res was usually understood as a sort of particle (an atom, a corpuscle and the like), 
and this more substantive image of corpuscular res was later to be complemented 
with that more processual one of a wave. the 19th century also witnessed a grow-
ing importance of statistical descriptions whereas the first part of the 20th century 
was finally forced to drop “matter” (in the sense of “material reality”) approaches 
to the object of physical investigation (cf. heisenberg 1989: 3–14, 98, 124) and also 
saw the rise of relativistic physics based on arbitrary (i.e. lorentz) transformations 
as well as quantum mechanics based on probability calculus. Although the Einstein-
ian geometrical attitude as well as the Erwin Schrödinger’s equation is still determ-
inistically-oriented, the very modern understanding of causality, which underlies it, 
1 For a possible illustration see černevičiūtė, Strazdas (2014).
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has since lost its unshakeable status. Philosophical reflections on the situations have 
been proposed. however, the philosophical stances, shedding light on the current 
situation in the sciences, did not fundamentally arise as a response to the present 
context but rather preceded it.
modern causality is nothing but the object as Gegenstand, i.e. setting of constant 
(ständig) presences in physis in accordance with a priori networks such as “laws” 
of conservation (of energy), of least action and the like (cf. Wittgenstein 2010: §6.3). 
Gottfried Wilhelm leibniz, with his monadology, vis primitiva activa and vis viva, 
already understood this non-material and transcendental nature of (modernly con-
ceived) reality, and he clearly based modern ontology on the a priori2 principle of 
identity. Equiprimordially, the object is revealed in its identity by the self-identical 
subject. in the kantian and post-kantian philosophy there is manifested the trans-
formation of the principle of sheer identity, while identity is crucially understood to 
be identical with non-identity, the self with the non-self, the object with the subject, 
the representation with the will, the for-itself with the in-itself, the phenomenon with 
the noumenon. Accordingly, philosophy revealed the depth of possible contradictions 
and irregularities underlying the contradiction-free, law-like and regularity-oriented 
mathematical and thus deterministic, (conception of) reality. hence, the dire need for 
statistical descriptions, arbitrary transformations of variables (lorentz transforma-
tions in maxwell’s equations) and probabilistic approach to materialistic-image-free 
physis had all already for some time been anticipated in philosophy.
the no-more-(sheerly)-deterministic course of the postmodern was also already 
delineated in Bergson’s techno-vitalistic intuitions (Stasiulis 2014: 111–135) which, 
too, in turn had been enabled primarily by kantian transcendentalism. Another im-
portant reflection on the issue of techno-scientificaly creative postmodernism, beside 
the Bergsonian élan vital intuition, is the post-kantian-and-Schellingian thought of 
heidegger. it is in terms of these two different strategies of post-kantian noumenal-
ist thought that we shall outline and assess different stances in the face of the post-
modern situation in natural sciences. We take both Bergson’s and heidegger’s thought 
to be post-Schellingian and to be differentiated by the different relation of identity 
and non-identity, rationality and irrationality, the light and the dark principles which 
manifest in them (Stasiulis 2014: 265–270). What results are different conceptions of 
time, approximately corresponding to the differences of the fundamentals which un-
derlie the stances of philosophizing scientists Prigogine and Dürr.
Preliminary comparison: Heidegger and Bergson
the following are the major differences between philosophies of Bergson and heideg-
ger. Bergson, in his conception of intuition and élan vital, merges the two principles of 
identity and non-identity, which accordingly correspond to the mechanistic conception 
2 We are justified in describing Leibniz’s contribution in transcendental aprioristic terms, even though he was 
a pre-kantian because leibnizian notions can be considered precursory of kantian ones (De Risi 2007: 300).
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of the universe and the indeterminacy of the will. the mechanistic understanding here 
is retained but it is united with and subordinated to the driving life force, gnawing 
into the future. it is but a Galilean physics driven to its ontological conclusion: the 
principle of sheer activity of the subiectum (or paradoxical activism-passivism (cf. 
Stasiulis 2011, 2014: 63–65, 140–147) has underlain this physics since its very incep-
tion. the Galilean physics and its philosophical ratio – the subjectum – is, according 
to heidegger, Being-historically dependent on the ancient Greek principle of pres-
ence/essence, or ousia and energeia, and, to wit, on the Being-forgetful manifestation 
thereof3. therefore, heidegger is able to evaluate this revelation of Being in terms of 
his authentic repetition (or retrieval) (Wiederholung) of the Greek revelation of ousia. 
Ousia is now construed not as sheer constant presence but as a unity of the three ec-
stasies of time, gathered by the fourth dimension thereof, i.e. Being (Beyng). Whereas 
the authentic construal indicates the primordial unity of the three separate ecstasies, 
the inauthentic one turns out to consist in a radical separation of the three ecstasies 
and their falling into three separate, though historically as well as ontologically, equi-
primordially interconnected inauthentic ontologies.
The first one is the inauthentic shape of the ecstasy of the past – mechanistic de-
terminism. the second one is the inauthentic shape of the present – atomism or cor-
puscularianism. Both of these are deprived of their ontological priority by Bergson. 
But the third one is the inauthentic shape of the future – voluntarism, which under-
stands being as a creativity, radically surmounting limits, or pure time, the in-and-
for-itself living futureness (also see Stasiulis 2014: 120–125). this happens to be the 
Bergsonian élan, which is also the philosophical basis of Prigogine’s slogan “time 
precedes existence” (Prigogine 2006: 27, 96, 139, 201). Just like Bergson, Prigogine 
places pure futureness, or time, at the source of reality and, for him, the equations 
and viewpoints of Galilean or post-Galilean physics are temporary manifestations of 
this source. time, in Prigogine’s scientitic view of nature, is inextricable. We can also 
notice here a principal accordance with the kuhnian notion of paradigm shift which is 
but a way progress (from latin pro-gredere) moves on. is it possible that the very no-
tion of progressing time and paradigm shift is not a dispensing from the older (“clas-
sical”) physics but is its very coming to its very essence, i.e. the full manifestation of 
the creative subject?
Discussion of natural scientific approaches: Prigogine and Dürr
Α. Prigogine’s approach
Prigogine maintains Newtonian laws to be insufficient and calls for a new paradigm 
of science, which, unlike its predecessor, will account for an importance of time and 
thus include chaos among its basic principles. this is supposed to yield new laws of 
nature which will also be able to deal with what Prigogine calls the Epicurean problem 
3 An indication of this is that Gallilean physics, which inspires Bergson’s processual (deterministic) living 
intuition (cf. Arendt 1998: 305; Stasiulis 2013: 77), is nominalist (cf. šaulauskas 2013: 15).
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of freedom. To remind, epicurus was dissatisfied with the conception of a determined 
straight-forward motion of atomic particles and introduced into this motion a clina-
men, an arbitrary going off the straight path of a particle, which was to account for or 
make possible (human) freedom. The problem of freedom is definitely, and especially 
in Bergson’s thinking, equated with the problem of time (i.e. of novelty, creativity, in-
ventiveness) and vice versa. thus, Prigogine sees an obvious analogy between the Ga-
lilean-Newtonian deterministic view of the universe and the view Epicurus opposed, 
on the one hand, and between the Epicurean solution and his own Bergson-inspired 
time-based chaotic universe, on the other hand. We must emphasize the familiar im-
portance of the influence of Bergson’s thinking on the view of Prigogine because it 
is only because of this radically new philosophical approach developed by the French 
philosopher that the Belgian scientist is able to make his transition “from probabil-
ity to irreversibility”, that is from the probabilistic treatment of the still-deterministic 
equations in the context of quantum mechanics to the fundamental insertion of the ar-
row of time into the very fabric of isness and, what is more, to the ontological priority 
of the surge of time. While in the classical deterministic physics (projected according 
to the Cartesian method onto the Cartesian system of axes) there had been no place 
for indeterminacy and novelty as it had asserted the ontological priority of the abstract 
geometrical space over the merely-illusory time, Prigogine’s new paradigm claims to 
bring the end of deterministic certainty as well as to reflect the actual complexity of 
the world. he also considers human (“subjective”) creativity to be part of a more fun-
damental tendency of time, manifesting itself universally on every level of nature. to 
note, Prigogine supports his philosophy with his own Nobel Prize winning scientific 
research on self-organising systems and dissipative structures.
here are two major characteristics of the Belgian’s stance. Firstly, Prigogine’s ap-
proach is in tune with (post)modernity’s progressive mood, its evolutionary inclina-
tion. Furthermore, it should not be considered to radically revolutionize the modern 
mode of thought but exactly to bring it to its vitalistic fruition or essence. Darwinian 
mechanistic evolution was compatible with the materialistic natural science of his 
time, whereas modern natural science of that time (19th century) still had not caught 
up with its virtual essence. it took at the very least half a century more for it to both 
acquire a free relation to its materialistic imagery and to achieve a technological 
mastery over both nature and society (as, for instance, is exemplified in Theodor W. 
Adorno, Jean Baudrillard etc.). it is only then that it can construe its own self as but a 
manifestation of virtual vitalistic evolutionary creativity, a tool at the hands of a surge 
of time (or, in our terms, as the principle of subiectum conceived as the principle of 
physis (nature) itself).
Secondly, Prigogine’s view is clearly reliant on the duality of past and future, de-
terminacy and indeterminacy, or, to trace it to its most remote historical roots, on 
the Epicurean mode of thinking. Because it was the atomism of the latter that intro-
duced the very problem of determinism versus freedom. it was only by a twist of 
Democritus’ thought that Epicurus was able to do it because the problem of determ-
inism versus freedom had no place in Democritus’ thought. the atom for Democritus 
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was but a manifestion of the principle of peras, or limit, according to which all ancient 
Greek thought was unfolding. this peras, or essence, was conceived to be in unity 
with non-essence, hence the images of both atoms and void. this unity was what 
the movement of the singularily manifested universe consisted in. the ancient Greek 
problem was that of the unity of ousia (“essence”) and kinesis (movement, movedness) 
which is totally alien to the posterior problem of determinism and indeterminism (cf. 
heidegger 1979; Stasiulis 2014: 139, 167). What is more, it is only on this inauthentic 
disjunction of essence and non-essence that the philosophical basis of (post)modern 
science can thrive. thus, Being is divided into regions of mechanicality and spon-
taneity and various relations thereof. Prigogine’s view is also based on this division 
(Stasiulis 2014: 167–168).
B. Dürr's approach
the notion of alte Physik, which is contradicted by Dürr (2012), is the following. the 
world, or the existence, is ultimately composed of material particles which move and 
interact mechanistically according to laws uncovered by the natural scientist. What is 
more, the idea of the elementary particle is that it has no “form” but only “matter”. 
the forms of the visible world we live in arise from combinations of particles that 
come about according to the so-called laws of nature, given enough – indeed, a “very 
long” span of – time. Also, the material particles are individual, separated from one 
another, as it were, lonely, and estranged in (geometrical) space. thus, they interact 
over long distances “due to gravity” and, given sufficient time, form molecules and so 
on and so forth. to sum up, the idea is that of “material” separate elementary building 
blocks of the universe, which interact in accordance with (natural) laws projected in 
geometrical space and thus give rise to the visible world and its “subjective” qualities.
As heidegger already noticed, this idea of “matter” as elementary substance was 
already available in ancient Greece and was discredited by Aristotle’s superior notion 
of ousia as form, or eidos (morphē) (heidegger 1979: 268–282, 294–301). Underlying 
Aristotle’s theorizing was also a pre-conceptual understanding of immaterial – “tran-
scendental” – interrelatedness of things, explained and thematized by heidegger in his 
analysis of the Zusammenhang of Zeug (heidegger 2006: 63–114; Stasiulis 2014: 169 
and below). Post-Cartesian physics sought to uncover stable laws operating in reality, 
i.d. it narrowed the question of Being and the world to the most proximally available 
beings, the res (Stasiulis 2011: 19–20). But, as it was in modern times already noted 
by Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, the stability of reality is but a surface under 
which there lies the original irregularity of the ground (cf. heidegger 1995: 165–167; 
Schelling 2006). While the activity, underlying the visible, actual things, was by 
Aristotle called dunamis, or (in the usual latin translation) potentiality. the idea of 
material elementary particles had been unpopular among great German thinkers at 
least since leibniz (through immanuel kant, Georg Wilhem Friedrich hegel, Arthur 
Schopenhauer, heinrich hertz etc.) but it was probably only in the 20th century think-
ing of heisenberg that the very development of physics itself gave the opportunity to 
give up the old “materialistic” notion. Now, for heisenberg and his school, at bottom 
4 8 Nerijus Stasiulis. On the conception of the creative in natural science and  
philosophical reflections thereof
there is no matter but potentiality. Aristotle’s wisdom is retrieved and proves fruitful 
in the context of the (reflection on) the results of contemporary natural science.
this is exactly what Dürr asserts. he introduces the notion of haps (ß happen, in 
German: Wirks (ß wirken) which is to replace the notion of particles. it means that at 
bottom there is no matter, no material particles but only potentialities. Potentialities 
are active and they come into existence every instant. in this sense, the world that we 
see is being created (and upheld) every instant. thus, at bottom there is not reality 
(lat. realitas ß res), but Wirklichkeit, or actionality. the structure of Wirklichkeit is 
not that of individual material res, but that of primordial relation.
Professor Dürr presents the prehistory of this idea. the old solar-system model 
of atom proposed by Niels Bohr was calculated not to work as electric forces were 
unable to keep the electrons going around the nucleus and thus they were supposed 
to “fall”. the conclusion was drawn that there are no electrons, no matter, but only 
the relation (described by the mathematical equation). According to loius de Broglie, 
the electron is but a swinging wave, a nothing that swings – not a wave at all, to 
be precise, but a complicated form of swinging. All material images of the atom are 
just superficial illustrations; in fact, there is no matter, but only a Gestalt, a primor-
dial relation. therefore heisenberg wanted to get rid of the atom itself and turned to 
the Aristotelian notion of potentiality and he also appreciated the Platonic immaterial 
principles exposed in Timaeus and the fire of Heraclitus (Heisenberg 1989: 12, 29–30, 
39). it was also his intention to do away with Cartesian dualism and to demonstrate 
the closeness or even identity of his thinking and of his Catholic faith, thus doing 
away with the absurd debate of science versus religion. Both science and religion have 
to do with the revelation of the one, or Wirklichkeit.
thus, according to the afore-said interpretations of quantum physics, there is at 
bottom the one, the unity. Both Dürr’s approach and that of Prigogine’s claim to be 
holistic. However, they must not be identified even in the most general outline. How 
are the two understandings of unity different?
Concluding comparison: Dürr and Prigogine
Both heidegger and Bergson assert the primacy of the continuum, the one. But for 
heidegger this one is ecstatically giving rise to the three dimensions of time without 
coinciding with it and thus it is the fourth dimension – Being – which borders on the 
ineffable; while for Bergson the élan coincides with time and with the surge of life, 
or creativity. Bergson’s one is a philosophical stance that can be grasped via subject’s 
(self-)intuition, in other words, by the urge of creativity, while heidegger’s one is the 
pre-philosophical source of thought, not reducible to sheer activity and to the sub-
jectum (cf. Stasiulis 2014: 186–199). hence, Prigogine’s Bergson-inspired claim to the 
new chaotic laws of nature that have grown out of the older physics and chemistry is in 
line with the kuhnian notion of progress by radical paradigm change, whereas Dürr’s 
new holistic physics, he emphasizes, is not yet another one of paradigms; because 
paradigms are ways of intervening into the prior whole of physis, ways we grasp the 
world, but we always experience more than we can grasp, the whole is always more 
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(Dürr 2014). this relation to physis, to emphasize, transcends any one of all possible 
paradigms. While Prigogine also speaks about a holistic approach, his proposed holon 
is perfectly identical with the chaotically described within-worldly entities; according 
to him, it is part and parcel of possible (future) natural sciences.
But, in line with the heideggerian ontological difference, Dürr’s holon, just like 
Eckhartian Wirklichkeit, is not entity-like and is ineffable. Still, this holon harbours 
within itself the original relation of all potential and actualising things and this in-
terrelatedness is understood as forms, or Gestalts, according to which worldly entit-
ies come into being. Because of the Gestalts, the indeterministic Wirklichkeit is also 
not arbitrary; the future is open, unpredictable and still within ontological bounds. 
Whereas Prigogine’s universe is purely future-orientated and radically open. Also, 
Prigogine’s chaos seems to be radically solitary and for-itself in accordance with the 
oneness and self-sufficiency of Bergson’s élan vital and its abolition of the nothing 
(Stasiulis 2013: 77–80). But Dürr, like heidegger, takes the nothing into account and 
his chaos is a coupled chaos. According to him, it is precisely this coupled chaos (for 
instance, running is like falling on one foot, then on another, and so forth) which – 
Gestaltwise – gives rise to order and to life.
the life-giving Gestalt is beyond intellectualistic analysis and intellectual grasp-
ing and is more like having an inkling (Ahnung haben). Contrary to Prigogine, who is 
emerged in the particular techno-scientific findings of his day, Dürr thinks beyond old 
paradigm-shift physics and also beyond current biology which he considers to be but 
alte Physik (Dürr 2014). While vitalism still maintains that organisms are fundament-
ally made of cells, matter etc., physicists like Dürr have come to the conclusion that 
there is no matter and that there is a deeper principle, the Geist, which is the driving 
force. life and world are not clock-work, even if terribly complicated and yea chaot-
ically described. the “clock gone mad” would still be the subiectum. thus, it would 
be absolutely active, whereas the Geist- and Gestalt-based thought is not subjected 
to utter activity and is rooted in an original passivity. the subiectum turns out to be 
a queer vitalistic identity of identity and non-identity, the irrational and the rational, 
whereas the passivity-rooted original4 activity and life is the heideggerian ecstasy of 
the two aspects, i.e. it is beyond and has aufgehoben the opposition of deterministic 
space and vitalistic time, of rationality and irrationality.
heideggerian retrieval of Aristotelian and ancient Greek thought in the context of 
the 20th century’s techno-scientific, subjectist (meta)physics retrieves the wisdom of 
the unity of time and space, rationality and irrationality, action and passion, think-
ing and sensuality, which are also equiprimordially the unity of the three-ecstasies of 
time, the authentic ousia. Dürr’s philosophical physics can be considered a fair illus-
tration of heideggerian achievement and of its fundamental relevancy to the sphere of 
natural sciences.
4 “Originality” originally means rootedness and even primordiality rather than sheer novelty.
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Conclusions
modern science sprang as an early manifestation of the principle of the subiectum 
which in turn is a phase in the development of the Western ontology of ousia, or 
a shape thereof. this early Galilean-Newtonian manifestation consisted in a ma-
terialistic, mechanistic and deterministic conception of beings and reality. As the 
subiectum historically entered its more mature phase, it revealed itself as a creative 
life force manifesting itself by means of technological prowess. Scientific ontology 
has been ridding itself of its materialistic imagery and its deterministic bias and has 
been discovering creativity’s ontological fundamentality. however, the fundamental 
notion of creativity is equivocal as illustrated by the actionality approach of Dürr 
and the chaotic temporal universe approach of Prigogine. this equivocality calls for 
a more philosophical orientation and an ontological assessment of physical or phys-
ics-based approaches. heideggerian thinking of ousia as a Being-rooted unity of the 
three ecstasies of time proves to be a seminal way of both approaching and assessing 
contemporary developments in and situation of natural science in its postmodern con-
text because it provides an insight into both historical and ontological bases of cur-
rent scientific stances as well as a potential to sublate (aufheben) their philosophical 
foundation. Unlike Bergsonian strategies of thought, it is not overwhelmed with the 
subjectist techno-vitalistic attitude but rather absorbs it into a form of another think-
ing. While this another thinking of Being is (yet) entirely formal and contains end-
less possibilities to specify its content, this articles has indicated two rather specific 
directions of investigation. The first one is an interpretation of the results of natural 
sciences based on the German and Aristotelian tradition of thought, invoking the no-
tions of Geist, Gestalt, or form, and potentiality. this line was taken up by the school 
of heisenberg. the second one is a reconstrual of Democritus’ ancient atomism in 
the light of the new reflection on ousia and the non-materialistic approach to particles 
in contemporary physics. this line is to be taken up in future research and it is also 
relevant in terms of the basis of the concept of the creative because it has to do with 
the very ontological centre of this concept as it lies at the root of 1) the possibility of 
the causal unveiling of the world, 2) of the notion of a self-sufficient individual whose 
happiness is presented as a goal of the creative society, and 3) of the issue of freedom 
which is to be rooted in Beyng.
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aPIe KūrYBIšKUMO KONCePCIJĄ GaMTOS 
mOkSlUOSE iR FilOSOFiNiUS JOS SVARStymUS
Nerijus STASIULIS
Santrauka
Straipsnyje aptariamas kūrybiškumas kaip ontologinis principas. Pateikiamos 
chemijos srities Nobelio premijos laureato ilya Prigogine’o ir Wernerio 
Heisenbergo mokinio bei buvusio Maxo Plancko fizikos instituto direktoriaus 
Hanso-Peterio Dürro mokslinės ir filosofinės pažiūros, grindžiamos šiuo prin-
cipu. Jos vertinamos pasitelkiant haidegeriškąsias būties, subiectum, ousia ir 
laiko aptartis, kurios pačios iliustruoja kūrybiškumo sąvokos postmoderniojoje 
visuomenėje ir moksle haidegeriškojo apmąstymo būdo potencialą. Taip pat pa-
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sitelkiama bergsoniškoji kūrybiškumo samprata, kuri laikoma postmoderniojo 
technomokslinio kūrybiškumo filosofiniu pagrindu ir aptariama haidegeriš-
kuoju ekstatiškojo laikiškumo požiūriu. Gretinant Henri Bergsono ir Martino 
heideggerio sampratas, lyginamos Prigogine’o ir Dürro gamtamoksliškai grin-
džiamos pažiūros.
reikšminiai žodžiai: kūrybiškumas, ilya Prigogine'as, hansas-Peteris Dürras, 
henri Bergsonas, martinas heideggeris, ontologija.
